John Robb, a terror analyst with the capacity to put events into context within the big picture frame, recounts the Zarqawi scorecard. In short, he succeeded in all but one of his strategic missions, displayed adaptability, but ultimately didn’t have the complete adaptability necessary to continue, which cost him his life.

Were we to compare him to a business entrepreneur, he brought his vision to fruition, went public with his company, but when the company needed sound business management more than fresh innovation, he was unable to fully transition to that role.

But the public company continues in its business.

The NY Times provides the details of the errors he made, as well as the excellent work done by his hunters in the military intel units. However, the biggest news, strategically speaking, was not taking him out. It was in getting insiders to sell him out.

And not just the insiders they captured:

Indeed, what the Americans had always lacked was someone from inside Mr. Zarqawi’s network, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, who would betray him — someone close enough and trusted enough to show the Americans where he was.

According to a Pentagon official, the Americans finally got one. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because details of the raid are classified, said that an Iraqi informant inside Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia provided the critical piece of intelligence about Mr. Rahman’s meeting with Mr. Zarqawi. The source’s identity was not clear — nor was it clear how that source was able to pinpoint Mr. Zarqawi’s location without getting killed himself.

“We have a guy on the inside who led us directly to Zarqawi,” the official said.

In a news release on Thursday morning, American military commanders hinted strongly that a member of Mr. Zarqawi’s inner circle had pointed the way. “Tips and intelligence from Iraqi senior leaders from his network led forces to al-Zarqawi,” the release said.

Iraqi officials confirmed that Mr. Zarqawi had indeed been sold out by one of his own.

“We have managed to infiltrate this organization,” said Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Iraq’s national security adviser. He declined to elaborate.

Just how the Americans were able to get the information from the source was also unclear. In an interview, a Jordanian official close to the investigation said the mission that killed Mr. Zarqawi was a joint operation conducted by the Americans and Jordanian intelligence. The source inside Mr. Zarqawi’s group, the Jordanian official said, had been cultivated at least in part by Jordanian intelligence agents.

“There was a man from Zarqawi’s group who handed over the information,” the Jordanian official said.

So, despite Zarqawi being dead, the remaining command officials are aware that one within their ranks is a traitor. Which means Zarqawi’s immediate successors can’t proceed a a united force, since they don’t know the identity of the betrayer working beside them. Expect some internal bloodletting to ensue.

Meanwhile, back at the war, the larger insurgency continues, fuelled by specifics that Zarqawi never controlled. The populace resents the occupying forces, there remains a 60% unemployment rate - providing the insurgency a huge available labor pool - and the Shia majority continues its marginalization and decimation of the Sunni minority. Zarqawi had a lot of raw materials handed to him and understood how to seed that fertile soil to make the insurgency grow,

And while a brief shift in US public opinion will occur - just as it did when Saddam was captured - it remains up to the new Iraqi leadership to demonstrate a growing capacity to end the sectarian bloodshed, to quickly reduce the unemployment rate and rebuild a torn infrastructure that leaves everyone dissatisfied. That’s a herculean set of tasks that even the wisest and swiftest leaders may find remains beyond their capacities. And the grace period the Iraqi public will grant to achieve this in will prove to be short.

Longer term, and bigger picture again, Echidne displays the troubling realities of another subset of the Iraqi society - larger than the Sunnis - who are being disenfranchised: the women.

Ever since the Shah of Iran was toppled 27 years ago, the overriding goal of US Middle East policy has been the containment of extremist fundamentalism of radical Islamists because they try to destabilize all neighboring governments, a task made easier when those governments are corrupt and repressive, too. And while it’s true that Saddam was as repressive and corrupt as any other, and deserving of overthrow, the secular society he advanced was his one significant positive achievement that deserves to live on.

Should a stabilized society arise from the smouldering ruins of the failed neo-Bush planning, but the society only provides a democratic construct for its male half, then the aggressive implementation of imposed democracy will ultimately prove to be a Faustian bargain. The slaughter of half will end while the rape rooms of the other half will be expanded.

And that’s what we’re asking our troops to risk their lives for. Or to put it more accurately, that’s what the small minority of remaining Bush supporters is demanding that our troops continue to risk their lives for.

While they cheer the demise of Zarqawi, I mourn the enslavement of the women and vehemently refute there’s any value at all to such a false democracy.