Yes, Matt Yglesias has done a thorough job of debunking the case for making Iran the new bogeyman of American foreign policy. I think it useful to flesh it out more, to add further perspective.
First, I’ve long believed the immediate pursuit of nuclear weaponry by Iran is defensive. But the next argument encountered is that once Iran gets The Bomb, a Pandora Box opens. Though having a nuke or two is not much compared to the devastation Iran would experience in a nuclear exchange with the US, Pakistan or Israel, we’d next have to postulate where Iran would aim its mini-response.
Would they try to devastate a section of Israel, with the radioactive cloud drifting across neighboring Arab states, for the luxury of saying “We devastated the Jews!” just before Iran’s population is reduced to shadows on the sidewalk? That’s pretty doubtful, to the point of excluding the possibility as an offensive tactic. Now if they faced a broad array of incoming nukes, they might consider such a thing as their last reply before they’re completely annihilated. But then the best solution to prevent that would be to not attack Iran with nukes, and to persuade Pakistan and Israel to avoid nuking Iran, as well.
But then, what if Iran took its small arsenal and gave it away to terrorists, so the terror group could do a sneak attack on one or two cities in any country, which might be our country? Once again, if any nuclear power underwent such a nuclear attack, it would be a foregone conclusion that they (us?) would still try to identify the nukers and the nuke suppliers, for an in-kind retaliation. And, if we weren’t certain who the culprit was, you can bet we’d retaliate with nukes against every chief suspect. Which, in a worst case scenario, means we’d nuke Iran, North Korea and a certain mountainous region of Pakistan.
Only Pakistan, as an entity, would survive such a response. But it would lack the carry capacity to hit us in return. Most likely, the world, as a whole, would condemn us, lots of sabres would rattle, but none would take the next step of attacking us, or the entire globe would be subject to a nuclear winter.
So once again, the concept of Iran using their new but limited power as an offensive tactic remains unlikely. As well, delivering their limited nuclear strength to a terror group would also open the door to the possibility of immediate blowback: the terrorists could bite the hand that feeds them. Even a complete madman in charge of Iran could easily see that.
Which only leaves one way to buy the Pandora’s Box argument. If Iran ramps up its capacity to produce more nukes and better missile delivery systems, it could join the other nuclear giants as a major player in the nuclear chess game.
But if that were so easy to accomplish, instead of something that takes several decades to achieve, then others - like the longtime nuclear China - would have done so long ago. Only the handful of major early nuclear powers has both the arsenal and the missile throw capacity to accomplish that. So, at the very least, we’re looking at decades before Iran could ever pose any similar threat.
In reality, China is the only long-timer with a sufficiently sized arsenal that poses the first and greatest threat of achieving a worrisome level of offensive capacity to threaten us directly. And the best way to keep Iran from ever achieving similar strength is to corral the available fissile raw material available globally. Which means, destroying the largest cache of that - the old Soviet supply - to eliminate the amount that could find its way to the black market.
We’re currently pursuing that eradication at a rate that would eliminate those supplies in 6 to 8 years. And if that’s considered not fast enough, we could certainly afford the relatively inexpensive cost of accomplishing that faster. Which I’ve long argued is the most sensible course to take.
Now, assuming that gets accomplished in less than a decade, what does that leave us for a projection of what Iran could accomplish if it seeks to amass a nuclear offensive capacity? Not much. Their limited capacity could only offer some deterrent potential to prevent other nuclear powers from attacking Iran, but any power so deterred could choose to bear the limited retaliatory strike while eliminating Iran completely.
Unless such a stronger power is such a small country that they’d still be decimated by any nuclear strike.
In simpler terms, the only such nuclear player that needs to fear that is Israel. Which means the real danger of Iran gone nuclear is to Israel and our current challenge to Iran is being made for the defense of Israel…. perhaps. But even then, as I pointed out already, Iran would gain its own nuclear annihilation, so why would Iran ever consider its limited arsenal to have any practical offensive value?
They wouldn’t. So the remaining ‘what if ‘ asks if there could be another ulterior motive on our part. What if the current sabre-rattling is just using the nuke argument to create an excuse to attack Iran and topple its government? What then would we gain?
A funder and supporter of terrorist groups like Hizbullah and Hamas would be eliminated. But other funders and supporters would continue and new ones could arise. And likely would arise in response to our attacking Iran.
Furthermore, if we went after Iran with anything less than a nuclear assault, the real Pandora’s Box of possible negative outcomes would be opened. Just as occurred in Iraq, a much, much smaller nation.
We might gain some control over Iran’s oilfields, but again, as we’ve seen with Iraq, a resistance movement could create enough sabotage to seriously limit that control. And that’s assuming we’d have the manpower to police the oilfields of Iran and Iraq simultaneously. Which we don’t.
Thus, under any scenario that can be envisioned, the only motives we could have to take our current threatening tone towards Iran are pretty slim. The profit motive of oil supply control has too many expenses and negatives to be viable. The only profit potential argument that leaves is the profits available from weapons manufacture so long as we can manufacture wars to boost that trade.
From all of this conjecture then, the only plausible arguments about our government’s motives is that (a) it’s pursuing the profits of perpetual war via the arms trade, or (b) it’s looking for an excuse to nuke Iran out of existence, perhaps to demonstrate to every current and potential enemy that we’re willing to use our nuclear arsenal no matter what the rest of the world thinks.
That raises the greatest question: if it’s profits our government is after, are we willing to pay the costs (which includes, especially, the lives of our troops, along with every retaliation that may come to our homeland, while we do not share the profits) and, if the goal’s nuking Iran as a lesson in deterrence, is it likely to succeed to deter current and potential enemies?
The answer to both possibilities is clearly ‘No’. The potential cost does not justify the potential gain. The potential deterrent is offset by the potential for numerous outcomes that increase threats against us.
It makes more sense to accelerate the schedule for destruction of raw materials needed for the manufacture of nukes. It makes more sense to utilize diplomacy to fashion non-proliferation treaties and gradually eliminate nuclear weaponry so it can never fall into hostile hands. And it makes more sense to weigh the potential of all the nations with enormous capacities to wreak nuclear nightmares on the world. China, Pakistan, India and Russia are the big players that are not longterm allies. And while major efforts to forge such alliances have been undertaken, especially with Russia and India, such alliances with Pakistan and China have a long way to go.
Nuking their neighbor, Iran, does not create ripe opportunities to forge stronger alliances with any major player among those four. More likely, it would provoke two or more of those four to build a counter-alliance. And that new Cold War standoff would pose enormous economic perils with all competing for dwindling supplies of oil to sustain the needs of their huge populations.
Sanity says the most practical national security strategy is to eliminate the raw materials, negotiate treaties and develop alternate energy sources. The propaganda campaign against Iran produces an array of numerous unfavorable outcomes that lead only to further dangers and greater casualties for Americans. It does not produce additional national security. It results in less.