So now Texas Democrat Silvestre Reyes, soon to be chair of the House Intelligence Committee, is taking a position on Iraq his conservative detractors never expected: ‘an increase of 20,000 to 30,000 U.S. troops as part of a stepped up effort to “dismantle the militias.” ‘

But when asked what he told Pelosi about his thinking on Iraq, Reyes replied: “What I said was, we can’t afford to leave there. And anybody who says, we are going pull out our troops immediately, is being dishonest … We’re all interested in getting out of Iraq. That’s a common goal. How we do it, I think, is the tough part. There are those that say, they don’t care what Iraq looks like once we leave there. Let’s just leave there. And I argue against that. I don’t think that’s responsible. And I think it plays right into the hands of Syria and Iran.”

Reyes also said he is eager to see the recommendations Wednesday from the bipartisan panel headed by former secretary of State Jim Baker and former Democratic chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Lee Hamilton. By some accounts, the panel is set to recommend an adjustment of course that will include the beginning of troop withdrawals pegged to progress on the ground along with other political and diplomatic initiatives. But Reyes said such ideas are not likely to substantially change his own views on the subject. “I’m very interested in reading what their recommendations are. But this is my position.”

And, by the time you read this, the report of the Iraqi Study Group will be out. There is at least one certain flaw in their result, as there is in Reye’s position. To resolve the chaotic violence roiling a nation that held more than 25 million people when the war began, how many of those 25 million were consulted or heard, in the process of deciding this country’s way forward?

After all, out of all the rationales ever provided for invading their country, the only one that offered a positive was the idea that they might enjoy a form of democratic governance. So it’s fair to ask: if they are to be led by a government of, by and for the people, why weren’t the opinions of their people considered?

As Kevin Drum notes, Glenn Reynolds consulted the rabid rightists of Ameican blogdom. I’m not sure who Reyes has consulted or considered, but because he was opposed to the war at the outset, he’s likely been more considerate than most.

The Iraqi Study Group, presumably, has heard from US government officials, military analysts, members of the diplomatic corps, and possibly, one or more Iraqi government officials. While I can’t define the exact sources of their information, I can be certain of some crucial parties to the outcome whose participation hasn’t even been sought: the leaders of the Iraqi groups engaged in violent conflict.

Have you ever heard of another successful ceasefire, truce, surrender, or end to a war that excluded representatives of the armies and armed groups doing most of the fighting?

Expand the process to include the relevant parties

Prior to the ISG Report release, we’ve already heard that it will call for some level of negotiating with other regional parties. It’s considered to be controversial that it likely includes Iran and Syria in that mix.

I think that suggestion misses an overriding question: should the opinions of government officials in Iran and Syria really be considered representative of the whole of the Iranian and Syrian populations? It’s painfully obvious that Prime Minister Maliki doesn’t represent the whole of Iraq and that the Bush White House doesn’t represent the whole of American thinking. The ISG represents a wider range of thought than the Bush White House, but it also falls well short of the American political spectrum.

I propose that consultation and negotiation with al-Sistani, al-Sadr, and al-Hakim begin, along with leaders of the Sunni insurgency groups, Kurds and others within Iraq. I further propose that it’s insufficient to limit that solely to the current elected members of the Iraqi government, although even that would be a better path forward than can be found in Tehran and Damascus.

Charting the pragmatic path forward from what is known

We know that the White House keeps insisting that the violence is led by Al Qaida. We know that some powerful Shia leaders would like to exact revenge on Ba’athists and others who supported Saddam Hussein. We know that regions within Iraq where much of the Sunni population resides is relatively oil-poor and that Sunnis seek a sharing of that key resource, to provide a more secure economic foundation for that population.

And we know that the current elected government of Iraq has failed to resolve each of these matters of dispute. It should be obvious that the circle of negotiating parties needs to be expanded beyond the two principal groups whose efforts so far have been stalemated: the Bush White House and the current government of Iraq.

Further, from UN estimates, 1,000 Iraqis are being displaced daily. They’re fleeing the combat zones and many are leaving the country completely. That’s 30,000 per month. That’s 360,000 per year. That’s a lot of people, about 1.5% of the entire Iraqi population, becoming refugees every year the conflict continues.

I’ll let others provide parallels of what a 1.5% annual displacement rate would mean in our country over 3 to 4 years, by state, ethnicity, etc.

But here’s what we don’t know. Who are these refugees? What impact does their flight have on the population left behind?

Experts on refugee movements in wartime suggest the best educated professional classes, the wealthy and middle classes constitute the majority of those taking flight. It’s not hard to make a parallel to the evacuation process that occurred in New Orleans as Hurricane Katrina approached: most of the poorest lacked the resources to get out.

In addition to that consideration, we know that the rebuilding efforts during our occupation of Iraq have left a majority of the country unemployed. As a result of that plus the refugee flow, the middle class in Iraq has been decimated. Which means the remaining population faces these dilemmas:

* The powerful and monied elites represent not only segments of the Iraqi population but their own interests in maintaining their own power.

* The poorest lack the capacities of the educated professionals necessary for infrastructure rebuilding, and for social welfare maintenance (health, education, etc).

* Factions within the fighting groups have begun to fill the social welfare role. This was recently most evident in the way the Sadr brigade responded to the Thanksgiving Day massacre. And that mirrors the course utilized by Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has proven successfull in building popular support for that group.

* The poorest are motivated to fight for their survival. And with the least left to lose, they are freer to take the greatest risks, no matter how strong the groups they view as their enemies (which include our military forces).

Pragmatism includes the removal of political blinders

As former Iraqi ambassador Joe Wilson noted, Maliki is too weak to resolve these impasses. Wilson also correctly advised that we find the right starting point:

“There are no doubt efforts to provoke even greater violence. Ask who benefits from the utter collapse of Iraq as a nation state and work back from there.”

(And if you didn’t read the rest Wilson provided there, read the highlights here)

Usually, in pursuit of the interests at work in conflicts and civil wars, the primary motivation is greed. Pursuit of wealth and pursuit of power. Second to that is the motivation of fear.

So who benefits from Iraq’s utter collapse? Outside of Iraq, only the governments of nations who believe they can overthrow what remains to capture Iraq’s oil fields could be motivated by greed. And frankly, I don’t see most of the neighboring nations wielding sufficient power to achieve that. Syria lacks that power. So does Saudi Arabia. Of its direct neighbors, Iran’s already learned it can’t succeed militarily against a united Iraq, but it might be tempted by a divided Iraq. Turkey probably has the most available manpower and firepower of all the neighbors, but provoking additional internal problems with its Kurdish population would limit its incentive to pursue that course.

Thinking outside that regional box, there are three large and growing populations in the world that are competing for much of the world’s oil resources: China, India and the US. India, because of its nuclear counterbalance with Pakistan, cannot easily act without inflaming Pakistan and much of the Middle East by doing so.

Considering the whole picture, the powers that are displaying a penchant to defend Iran diplomatically and militarily provide the clearest clues. That would be Russia and China. So if there’s an axis of concern about those motivated by greed, Iran, Russia and China are the countries Wilson’s advice leads us to. As well, the motivations of our own government deserve a full consideration, too.

Who has already benefited most from the War on Iraq? All major oil producing nations, because of the oil price rises caused by the conflict. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and the Shias of Iraq currently provide over half the world’s oil supplies. So each of those countries has a motivation to maintain continuing conflict, but each could suffer if that conflict led to the complete collapse of Iraq. The Saudis and Kuwaitis, being Sunni societies, are aware that the Shia-dominated remains would be a potential source of continued trouble.

Summarized, Iran, backed by China and Russia (and aided by the much smaller Syria), might benefit most. Counter to that, the US, in alliance with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey, might also be competing from the standpoint of greed.

But we can’t disregard the other great motivator, of fear. Most of the Middle East, being Sunni, fear any result that brings Iran and Iraq into too close a Shia-dominant alliance. Turkey has already made it clear that too much independence for northern Iraq’s Kurds will draw a military response.

And Iran, seeking advantage from the mess, really doesn’t favor the prospect of a troublesome failed state to contend with. Its greatest advantage is obtained by keeping our military engaged and in reach of its current offensive capabilities, especially while it pursues the building of a strategic nuclear-arms defense.

So among the outsiders, the first preferences of all is to avoid a total collapse of Iraq. Iran could benefit most if such a collapse leads to an ethnic partitioning that might grant an alliance with the largest, Shia partition, but currently, its interests are best served by a prolonged conflict for several years more.

Based on these factors alone, the least attractive option is for us to grant what Iran seeks, so by any reckoning, keeping our troops heavily engaged there for more than a year or two is - in basic strategic terms - one of the biggest errors we could make.

But the political blinders also need to come off within Iraq

As previously noted, the current Iraqi government is too weak to stop the militias. Experts identify between 21 and 23 separate militia groups operating in Iraq.

Obviously, I lack access to all the intel about who those groups are and what motivates each. However, because - for four years - I’ve been reading the blogs of numerous Iraqis who don’t appear to be part of the militias, plus Juan Cole and other Middle East analysts, plus counter-terror experts like John Robb, and military analysts like Phillip Carter and friends, I’ve developed some general impressions that are likely to be fairly accurate.

The two largest militias competing for Shia dominance are al-Sadr’s and al-Hakim’s. Sunni militias have sought US protection from the anti-Hussein vengeance of Shias and some have been infiltrated by foreigners who may call themselves Al-Qaeda or not. It’s also likely that foreigners allied with Iran or Hezbollah are working in alliance with some Shia groups. Then there’s two competing Kurdish groups who are largely absent from most of the chaos in Baghdad and Anbar province. They’re not really a factor in the major violence, but are likely working with Israel’s Mossad (if not also our CIA) in maintaining an eye on Iran.

Because our media prefers easy definitions, much of this conflict is labelled Shia vs. Sunni, but serious analysts define it as a more fractured tribalism, with numerous subsets (thus, 21-23 visible militias). Because Americans struggle with old definitions of what ‘tribes’ constitute, it may be more useful to think of them as communities, neighborhoods or networks.

Folks in big city environments likely know which neighborhoods are heavily Irish or Italian or Latino or Polish because of their ancestral roots. And within each of those neighborhoods, there’s some who are not of the predominant nationality, but they are active in those neighborhoods and share common goals despite that difference.

Thus, in many neighborhoods, Sunnis and Shias work and play together fine. When outside militias start targeting the non-dominant subgroup in such a neighborhood, some neighborhood alliances remain, but some are broken, as suspicion mounts within the group being targeted by the outsiders.

And, just as occurs in urban neighborhoods where violent gangs disrupt the security of inhabitants, some neighbors ultimately choose to join a gang they think will provide them some of the security they’ve lost.

That’s the best parallel that can be drawn to overcome the simplicity that the Sunni-Shia definition of the divide provides. Politicians seeking solutions should understand that first before trying to tackle the seemingly intractable problem of creating order out of so much chaos.

Is there a way forward or is the chaos so advanced that nothing will work?

If you’ve not read John Robb before, his analyses will seem awfully bleak. For starters, try this one and this one. And this one.

Above all, however, the most important idea that should be advanced is that political caution and timidity is the surest path to continued, longterm failures that not only harm our interests but could snowball into a greater regional conflict - or worse, a World War.

Again, lacking the inside intelligence political insiders have, I certainly can’t provide all the answers. But among the bold type of ideas I do support are these:

* Our government has to overcome its penchant for only listening to and negotiating with the power elites within Iraq’s existing government. Though elites tend to fear populists as too unpredictable, they should communicate with, listen to and negotiate with people outside of the government.

* Our government should be prepared to break alliances with former paramilitary groups they’ve worked with previously, if those paramilitaries have branched out from containment of violence to death squad activities. It may seem to be a double-cross to do so, but it will be necessary to take down a few of these without warning, to eliminate the core of some of the militias. It’s brutal, it could backfire if every group decides we can’t be trusted, but I suspect it’ll have to be done.

* Of all the groups - and I’ve noted this before - the Sadr brigade provides our last best chance for a solution. Yes, he’s a populist. Yes, his brigade has killed US soldiers (anyone know which militias haven’t?) But with the middle-class fleeing, the society continues to evolve with the greater percentage of the working and non-working poor joining his ranks. Furthermore, he’s the leading Shia who has voiced a desire to heal the Shia-Sunni rift, and he’s known to be a nationalist, so any alliances he might develop with Iran would still likely be at arm’s length. In short, he’d be sufficiently autonomous to avoid being Iran’s puppet.

We should be asking him what he wants, what he thinks he can accomplish, and how we might - in unison - reach an end to the violence. As part of that, we should obviously seek an equitable outcome for the Sunni minority, probably including reconstruction funds from Sunni neighbors, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as added incentives.

* The biggest obstacle to al-Sadr comes from SCIRI’s al-Hakim. I don’t have an answer for that, it may come down to an armed struggle between those two as the other militias are removed from the current mix. But it seems clear that a Shia strongman offers the only hope for a way forward, and those two appear to be the strongest, with both stronger than Maliki.

* One only needed to read Riverbend over the past few years to understand that many Iraqis had great distate for big players in the new government (Ahmad Chalabi as one of many examples). They voted this government in for the sake of exercising a choice in the process, but often held their noses while doing so. (Just as we do in our democracy, choosing the perceived lesser of two evils, at times)

Part of the communication process has to be reaching out past all the power players, to ordinary citizens like her. Both those who remain and some who have fled should be engaged in these conversations. It could prove useful in figuring out which current government leaders maintain some credibility in the larger populace, and which garner no trust at all.

* And above all, our politicians and analysts have to strive towards open-mindedness, overcoming the bias that elites have to give greater credence to other elites because of shared motivations. They have to be open to hearing unpleasant truths from people they may not trust (like al-Sadr) and to the wisdom that can come from within the greater populace.

Similarly, they may have to abandon preconceived notions of the most-desired outcomes, because a level of greater order is going to be preferable to ongoing disintegration of the country. If the ISG delivers what’s been leaked previously, they’re going to recommend ‘Go Long, Go Deep, Go Home’ or something that sounds too concrete to me.

The fourth option - scant of detail - should be ‘Go Courageously To Every Iraqi’ in pursuit of unknowns that cannot be defined by a study group. Because, so far, we’ve engaged non-credible louts like Chalabi and Curveball, we’re hearing how regional elites in non-democratic nations must be negotiated with, and the principal voice being left out throughout is the word of the Iraqis in the middle, who desire lives that are safe and economically stable. Instead of limiting the decisionmaking based on the advice of a few hundred, in a country of 25 million, we ought to find a few hundred citizens with a few good ideas.

That’s often the strongest part of our democracy. We should grant that potential to theirs.