Aid to Pakistan much bigger than previously known and for foolproofless security
WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 — Over the past six years, the Bush administration has spent almost $100 million so far on a highly classified program to help Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s president, secure his country’s nuclear weapons, according to current and former senior administration officials.
But with the future of that country’s leadership in doubt, debate is intensifying about whether Washington has done enough to help protect the warheads and laboratories, and whether Pakistan’s reluctance to reveal critical details about its arsenal has undercut the effectiveness of the continuing security effort.
The aid, buried in secret portions of the federal budget, paid for the training of Pakistani personnel in the United States and the construction of a nuclear security training center in Pakistan, a facility that American officials say is nowhere near completion, even though it was supposed to be in operation this year.
A raft of equipment — from helicopters to night-vision goggles to nuclear detection equipment — was given to Pakistan to help secure its nuclear material, its warheads, and the laboratories that were the site of the worst known case of nuclear proliferation in the atomic age.
While American officials say that they believe the arsenal is safe at the moment, and that they take at face value Pakistani assurances that security is vastly improved, in many cases the Pakistani government has been reluctant to show American officials how or where the gear is actually used.
That is because the Pakistanis do not want to reveal the locations of their weapons or the amount or type of new bomb-grade fuel the country is now producing.
So Pakistan - current home to the Al Qaida high command - can produce unlimited nuclear fuel and we pay them nearly $17 million a year while they do so. After their big man on the nuclear campus passed on the technology to North Korea, Libya, Iran and possibly Afghanistan. Yet if Iran - without any nuclear weaponry - does not reveal what it knows, that could start World War III?
Yep, that sums up the latest excellent adventures in Bush foreign policy.
The New York Times has known details of the secret program for more than three years, based on interviews with a range of American officials and nuclear experts, some of whom were concerned that Pakistan’s arsenal remained vulnerable. The newspaper agreed to delay publication of the article after considering a request from the Bush administration, which argued that premature disclosure could hurt the effort to secure the weapons.
Since then, some elements of the program have been discussed in the Pakistani news media and in a presentation late last year by the leader of Pakistan’s nuclear safety effort, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who acknowledged receiving “international” help as he sought to assure Washington that all of the holes in Pakistan’s nuclear security infrastructure had been sealed.
The Times told the administration last week that it was reopening its examination of the program in light of those disclosures and the current instability in Pakistan. Early this week, the White House withdrew its request that publication be withheld, though it was unwilling to discuss details of the program.
Meanwhile, Pakistan doesn’t trust our motives enough to share weapons locations and our intel analysts guess that everthing’s nice and secure. Except Valerie Plame, of course, who was knocked off her nuclear watch because her husband challenged past intel assessments made by Bush about nuclear materials. Which only leaves the intel folks that got Iraq wrong to guess about Pakistan.
General Musharraf, in his memoir, “In the Line of Fire,” published last year, did not discuss any equipment, training or technology offered then, but wrote: “We were put under immense pressure by the United States regarding our nuclear and missile arsenal. The Americans’ concerns were based on two grounds. First, at this time they were not very sure of my job security, and they dreaded the possibility that an extremist successor government might get its hands on our strategic nuclear arsenal. Second, they doubted our ability to safeguard our assets.”
General Musharraf was more specific in an interview two years ago for a Times documentary, “Nuclear Jihad: Can Terrorists Get the Bomb?” Asked about the equipment and training provided by Washington, he said, “Frankly, I really don’t know the details.” But he added: “This is an extremely sensitive matter in Pakistan. We don’t allow any foreign intrusion in our facilities. But, at the same time, we guarantee that the custodial arrangements that we brought about and implemented are already the best in the world.”
Now that concern about General Musharraf’s ability to remain in power has been rekindled, so has the debate inside and outside the Bush administration about how much the program accomplished, and what it left unaccomplished. A second phase of the program, which would provide more equipment, helicopters and safety devices, is already being discussed in the administration, but its dimensions have not been determined.
Harold M. Agnew, a former director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory, which designed most of the United States’ nuclear arms, argued that recent federal reluctance to share warhead security technology was making the world more dangerous.
Installing a special switch requiring a code to arm the nukes is the failsafe part of the program that Pakistan refuses to use. They fear we’ll secretly disarm their nukes if they use the switches.
“Among the places in the world that we have to make sure we have done the maximum we can do, Pakistan is at the top of the list,” said John E. McLaughlin, who served as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time, and played a crucial role in the intelligence collection that led to Mr. Khan’s downfall.
“I am confident of two things,” he added. “That the Pakistanis are very serious about securing this material, but also that someone in Pakistan is very intent on getting their hands on it.”
That oughta help us sleep soundly tonight. Especially now that Pervie has all the judges and lawyers locked up while Osama remains free.



November 18th, 2007 at 10:57 pm
Question: Why was this program suddenly declassified and who authorized it?
Question: How could the U.S. allegedly spend a hundred million dollars but allegedly not gain access to Pak. weapons or their locations? Guns Gates and Guards?
Question: Will American PAL technology work on Pak. Nukes?
Question: Why doesn’t this add up?
Question: Is Halliburton or Blackwater involved here somewhere?
Question: Is Kahn involved in this operation? See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Qadeer_Khan
Question: Is it a violation of the NPT or AEA for this alledged cooperation to go on between the U.S. and Pak.? Was an agreement for cooperation obtained? If so what did it say?
Question: Who is in charge of U.S. government transparency here?