I’m disappointed that Democratic presidential candidates didn’t immediately denounce Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s request yesterday for a permanent US security force in Iraq. It’s not rocket science to figure out why the request deserves no consideration whatsoever at the present time.

The current Iraqi government will be two years old next month, so the current Parliament is halfway through its four year terms. Since the 12/15/2005 vote that elected that government, 1,721 US troops have died in Iraq.

And what’s the Iraqi government accomplished in that time? Pretty much nothing. It’s dominated by the United Iraqi Alliance (41.2% of the government) which is mostly Shia. The next three largest groups are dominated by Kurds (21.7%), Sunnis (15.1%) and secularists (8%). The largest Sunni group left the government on August 1, frustrated by the refusal of the Shias to work out a conciliation between the two sects. (See Juan Cole for the latest on this). The Kurds have been busy signing oil agreements with foreign companies, though the Shias call those contracts illegal.

That Shia bloc, the United Iraqi Alliance, has failed to please any of the other blocs, the US military or our government.

While 1,721 US troops have died, the bloc of al-Maliki and Ahmed Chalabi has twiddled its thumbs. Even within that Shia bloc, the Islamic Virtue Party withdrew from it last March, taking 15 seats with it. The largest subgroup within that United Iraqi Alliance is SCIRI, which is closely allied with Iran.

While 1,721 US troops have died, Sunnis have, only in recent months, helped clean out most of the foreign fighters that Bush continues to call Al Qaeda. And that Shia bloc doesn’t want those Sunni fighters incorporated into Iraq’s army and security forces still.

Leading Democrats should go on record as opposing al-Maliki’s request, with a caveat. Our troops have carried the burden of the struggle for a secure and stable Iraq. Our Treasury and taxpayers have carried the burden of that financial cost. What has the Shia dominated government contributed? Virtually nothing. And now they want to hire our troops to provide them security permanently? ‘Hire’ isn’t even the right word, as we’ll be paying for it and our soldiers will be dying, to protect the do-nothings whose refusal to compromise is the chief reason sectarian violence continues.

That sounds like a pretty rotten trade-off. Will some Democrat stand up and say they won’t honor any such deal unless and until the United Iraqi Alliance demonstrates some capability for compromise with its political opponents? Some Democrat should. Vehemently.

1,721 US troops have died and hundreds of thousands have fought and it’s about time someone stands up and says our troops and taxpayers can no longer accept the burden of the al-Maliki government failures. And if it continues to fail, the only answer that honors those who’ve borne the burdens and sacrifices is ‘No.’

It’s likely some are hesitant because violence has been down for three months, and the media is accepting the spin that this represents success caused by Bush’s troop escalation/surge. A look at the troop fatality numbers points to another likely cause for the reduction in violence.

Month/Fatalities/Events

Nov-06 70 - Rumsfeld fired
Dec-06 112 - Bush rejects Iraq Study group recommendations, orders escalation of troop count
Jan-07 83 - Infusion of larger force (surge) begins
Feb-07 81
Mar-07 81
Apr-07 104
May-07 126
Jun-07 101 - Deadliest 3 months completed since the war began in March 2003
Jul-07 78
Aug-07 84 - Iraqi Accord Front, the largest Sunni bloc (15.1%), departs the Iraq government on 8/1.
Sep-07 65 - Three days before, on 8/29, Moqtada al Sadr orders his Shiite forces to stand down for 6 months
Oct-07 38
Nov-07 32 - nearing end of lowest 3 month death total since Jan-Mar 2004

Moqtada al-Sadr’s forces were the largest in the fray, but they were becoming splintered. The rogue militias within were taking actions that caused his group to lose popular support in some areas of Iraq. His ceasefire not only caused the majority of his followers to stand down but it forced the rogue subgroups to conform or they’d be quickly decimated by US and Sunni forces.

It was Moqtada’s orders that produced the reduced casualties. And during that reduction, his chief rival in the Shia bloc - al-Hakim’s SCIRI - has continued its ethnic cleansing via the corrupt Interior Ministry. Which the government has failed to rein in.

And let’s look at what lies ahead.

With the pending Annapolis conference, the Bush administration is claiming it a big step forward to resolving the half-century Israel-Palestine conflict. But the most visible short term achievement at Annapolis will actually be the marginalization of Iran. That’s not exactly new as the Sunni dominated Arab nations have long disliked Iran, both because it’s Persian and Shia. Annapolis, however, peels away Iraq and Syria from a Shia alliance. That’s especially notable because Syria has long been Iran’s ally.

Going through the UN to isolate Iran, the Bush administration faced vetoes from Security Council members Russia and China. Annapolis provides an end-around, with Iran isolated from most of its neighbors, and sanctions from the Annapolis group will hurt Iran, no matter what Russia and China do.

Now let’s put all that in context with other events foreign and domestic.

1) Oil prices have approached the inflation adjusted all-time high a couple of times. Typical stock market patterns suggest a new high will be set after one or two more approaches. I’ve previously indicated the breakthrough could come as early as the 12/11 Fed meeting. And the ultimate new high should come no later than February. Exponential growth charts already show us into the near vertical phase which means a final spike and collapse is pending. (I projected a peak between $119-$122 per barrel).

2) Claiming success from the purge and from Annapolis, the Bush administration will claim some foreign policy success while trying to minimize withdrawal proposals as a primary issue into February, when there’s a good chance both emergent major party nominees will be known.

3) Many market watchers have predicted the fallout and bottom of the subprime mortgage crisis will arrive in February, too.

4) The principal foreign policy focus from December to February will likely be Iran now. That will continue to keep oil prices supported by market speculators.

5) However, Bush can’t contain and balance (or counterbalance) all these factors indefinitely. Remember Moqtada al-Sadr’s ceasefire ends by March 1, so Iraq could explode with fresh violence after that. The only way that can be prevented is if Bush and al-Malik’s government start achieving compromises with al-Sadr and between the Shia-Sunni sects.

Certainly there’s a fair amount of speculation in my assessments, particularly about market timing. But the least speculative is Moqtada’s contribution to the reduction in violence, and the fact that his ceasefire ends o the last day of February.

It’s a pretty reasonable guess that Bush will be pushing al-Maliki’s government towards some compromises; otherwise, he’ll have trouble hawking an agreement to offer al-Maliki a permanent US troop presence.

In conclusion, why should any Democrat hesitate to oppose the agreement now, coupled with the demand that Iraq’s government do something constructive to earn continued support? Politically, that would usurp the Bush agenda. It would also satisfy the public demand that it’s time to withdraw. After all, the proposals for short term funding of the war will be resuming in January. Bush can only make a case to the public if he can parrot ’surge success’ and ‘Annapolis success’ and ‘OMG Iran!’ and convince the public to pressure Congress to loosen the purse strings.

The best way to counter those claims is for Democrats to demand progress from the Iraq government, to remind the public how Moqtada al-Sadr’s ceasefire did more to spare troop lives than anything else, and to insist our troops and taxpayers have done all we can while Iraq’s leaders have failed.

We don’t have to cede funding without gaining a withdrawal commitment. And if al-Maliki’s government actually does something, Dems can then claim credit for applying the necessary pressure, both by public statements and by holding the purse strings tight.

Looking at the big picture, I can only wonder if any Democrats plan to make the case NOW, or will they avoid the minimal political risks, let Bush build his framework and call all the shots, and wonder next March (or next November) how Bush outplayed them once again.

I can think of at least 1,721 reasons a Democrat should stand up and say we’ve gone above and beyond the call of duty and it’s time for Iraq’s government to do its part for a change.